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DIVISIBLE DIVORCE: PRESERVATION OF THE WIFE'S
SUPPORT RIGHTS AFTER A VALID EX PARTE
DIVORCE DECREE
Whenever a husband or wife seeks a divorce and both are residents
of the same state the issues to be decided are purely dependent on
local law. The community interest in avoiding future problems of big-
amy and adultery by properly severing the marital relationship and
the interest of the wife in securing an adequate property settlement
can be protected in one action. Each party can be personally served
with process, and there is seldom a subsequent conflict with other
states over the validity of the adjudication of either interest. How-
ever, divorce is often sought after the husband or the wife has left the
matrimonial domicile and established a residence in another state. If
both states attempt to adjudicate all or part of the rights of the
parties in a divorce or support proceeding two conflicting decisions
may result, raising problems of conflict of laws. A recent Washington
decision, illustrates some of the problems and confusion that exist in
determining which state proceeding governs under the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution2 and its supporting statute.3
H and W were married and established a home in Massachusetts.
The marriage collapsed when H was transferred to Washington and
W refused to join him. After H sent W a verified copy of a divorce
complaint the latter immediately filed suit for separate maintenance
in Massachusetts, and after H made a general appearance the court
awarded W $203 a month as temporary support. H later obtained an
ex parte divorce in a Washington court, the Washington decree pro-
viding that he was to pay only $50 a month for child support. Shortly
thereafter, W secured three execution judgments in Massachusetts for
due and unpaid support installments and brought suit in Washington
1. Perry v. Perry, 318 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1957).
2. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.
And the Congress may... prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952) provides: "Such Acts, records and proceedings ...
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such state.., from which they
are taken."
Although this wording seems clear the literal meaning of the statute has never
been completely accepted by the Supreme Court, and exceptions have developed
to the literal mandate. See generally Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith
and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 153 (1949).
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to enforce these judgments. The Washington Supreme Court reversed
an award made by the trial court, declined to give the Massachusetts
judgments full faith and credit and held that the Washington divorce
decree cut off W's rights to receive any support payments accruing
after the divorce was granted.
The holding of the Washington court was based on an interpreta-
tion of Supreme Court decisions 4 dealing with the problems of full
faith and credit arising out of migratory divorces. Before examining
the interpretation adopted by Washington, however, it is necessary
to trace briefly the history of the relationship between the full faith
and credit clause and divorces granted where one party is neither
personally served with process nor present in the state where the
divorce is granted.
It is a settled rule that a divorce rendered in a state where neither
party has a bona fide domicile is not entitled to full faith and credit
in another state.5 If one party is domiciled in the state, however, the
marital relationship may be validly terminated in an ex parte pro-
ceeding.6 The status of this ex parte divorce under the full faith and
credit clause has been subject to some uncertainty. Although the
Supreme Court originally held that an ex parte decree was entitled to
full faith and credit, 7 this position was soon modified by a holding
that the full faith and credit mandate applied only when the ex parte
decree was rendered in the last matrimonial domicile," i.e., the last
state where the parties had lived together as man and wife. Under
this rule a person remarrying following an ex parte divorce in a state
other than the matrimonial domicile9 could be subjected to a prosecu-
tion for bigamy or adultery in a state not recognizing the ex parte
decree. The undesirability of this consequence was finally recognized
4. See notes 14-16 infra.
5. See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175
(1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179 (1901).
6. An ex parte proceeding is one in which one party is neither personally
served with process nor present in the state when the divorce is granted. The
Supreme Court recognized that an ex parte decree was valid at least within the
jurisdiction in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). The first American decision
recognizing the validity of an ex parte divorce was Harding v. Alden, 29 Greenl.
140 (Me. 1832). See Harwood, Alimony After a Decree of Divorce Rendered on
Constructive Service, 24 Ky. L.J. 241, 243 (1936).
7. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
8. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
9. For the purpose of this note the term "domicile" is used interchangeably
with "residence" since most American statutes fail to make a distinction in
determining legal residence requirements for the granting of divorces. See Reese
& Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 561, 565 (1953);
Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775
n.2 (1955).
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by the Supreme Court in 1942 in a case involving a conviction for
bigamous cohabitation arising out of one state's refusal to recognize.
a divorce decree granted in another1o The Court held that an ex
parte divorce obtained in any state must be given full faith and credit
as conclusively terminating the marital relationship. This decision
solved the problems created by the "matrimonial domicile" rule, but
raised new difficulties for a wife seeking support after a husband has
obtained an ex parte divorce granting little or no support. For exam-
ple, in many states separate maintenance is granted only where there
is an existing marital relationship and any right to sue for alimony
terminates with a divorce decree.' In light of a previous Supreme
Court decision, holding that support rights of the wife after a divorce
were determined by the laws of the divorcing state,1 2 it appeared that
the husband could avoid any obligation to support his wife by obtain-
ing an ex parte decree in a state where, by statute, the right to sup-
port terminated with the granting of the divorce.
However, if the law of the divorcing state were not controlling and
if the wife's right to support could be substantively separated from
the divorce decree, the granting of a divorce would not necessarily
terminate support rights when the wife was neither present at the
proceeding nor personally served with process. By adopting this rea-
soning the socially desirable result of having the decree recognized
in all states and the interest of the wife in securing an adequate
property settlement could be preserved much in the same manner as
if the actions had been brought in a single state having personal ju-
risdiction over both parties. This concept of dividing the elements of
10. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942). For purposes of
reaching a decision the majority assumed that the parties had acquired a bona fide
domicile in Nevada, the divorcing state. In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945) (Williams II), it was held that a sister state could question whether
domicile was, in fact, established in the divorcing state, and thus determine
whether that state had jurisdiction to grant the divorce. The extent to which
jurisdiction could be questioned was modified by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948), where it was held that jurisdiction of a state to grant the divorce could
not be collaterally attacked if both parties appear in the divorce proceeding. See
also Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948). There is no question in the principal case
that the Washington court had jurisdiction to grant the divorce, since IV appeared
specially to litigate the issue.
11. See, e.g., Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Ore. 140, 150, 200 P.2d 616, 625 (1949)
(alimony award can only be made at the time the court dissolves the marriage);
Marrobie v. Marrobie, 334 Mich. 447, 452, 54 N.W.2d 623, 625 (1952). Penn-
sylvania has no provision for permanent alimony, except where the wife is
insane. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 45 (1955).
For a comprehensive collection of cases and statutes concerning the availability
of alimony after a valid ex parte divorce see Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1953).
12. Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1913).
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a divorce was suggested by writers13 as a partial solution to the prob-
lems emanating from the requirement that all ex parte divorces be
given full faith and credit and was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Estin v. Estin.14 The Court here held that although an ex parte decree
was conclusive insofar as it terminated the marital relationship, one
state was not bound to accept an ex parte alimony adjudication of
another when, prior to the divorce, support proceedings had been in-
stituted in the state where the wife was domiciled. Two subsequent
decisions by the Court indicate that the presence of the prior support
action is not essential to the concept of divisible divorce. In Arm-
strong v. Armstrong's it was held that an ex parte divorce decree did
not bar the wife from later bringing an original action for support
where there was no adjudication of support rights in the divorce
proceeding. Then, in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,0 where it was clear
that the divorcing court intended to pass on the wife's support rights,
the Court found that this did not preclude a later support action in
another state.
Thus at the time of the Washington decision this rule can be stated
from the decisions of the Court: a state is required to give full faith
and credit to an ex parte decree of a sister state as conclusively sever-
ing the marital relationship; however, a state is not required to give
full faith and credit to an ex parte adjudication of the wife's right to
support. Two important problems involving subsequent support de-
crees are yet to be resolved. (1) What validity does the support de-
cree have in the state where the ex parte divorce was granted ?17 (2)
Which of the two opposing judgments in entitled to full faith and
credit in a third state faced with deciding which judgment to en-
force?18 Any solution of these problems depends on the theory
'adopted by the Court in allowing a separation of support rights from
the divorce decree and is directly considered in the principal case.
The Washington court, in refusing to enforce the Massachusetts
execution judgments granted pursuant to a prior support decree, ap-
plied reasoning derived from the Estin case. That decision is said to
rest on two distinct and independent grounds in determining why the
state granting the wife support does not have to give full faith and
13. See materials cited in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 n.2 (1948). The
possibility of splitting the elements of a divorce was also considered earlier by
Justice Douglas, concurring in Esenwein v. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 281-83 (1945).
14. 334 U. S. 541 (1948). See also Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948),
decided the same day and on the same facts as the Estin case.
15. 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
16. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
17. This question was specifically avoided by the Court in the Estin decision.
334 U.S. at 549.
18. Justice Frankfurter posed this question in a footnote to his dissent in the
Vanderbilt case. 354 U.S. at 428 n.3.
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credit to an ex parte adjudication of alimony rights:19 (1) the in-
terest of the state where the wife is domiciled in protecting her from
becoming a public charge creates an exception to the full faith and
credit mandate; (2) the right to alimony or support is a property
right that cannot be defeated without personal jurisdiction over the
wife. Washington adopts the first ground as controlling in the Perry
case,20 but in the alternative finds that if its interpretation of the
Estin decision is erroneous and full faith and credit must be given the
Massachusetts judgments other considerations lead to the same re-
sult."1 Since these two aspects of the decision are based on entirely
different reasoning each will be considered separately.
Utilization of the first ground of the Estin case, i.e., that the in-
terest of the state in protecting its resident is controlling, assumes
that both the judgment of the divorce state and that of the support
state are valid,22 and is essentially a solution to the conflict created by
the presence of two valid judgments. Thus the decree of the divorce
state is denied full faith and credit because of the controlling interest
of the support state in protecting its resident. When the decree of
the support state is sought to be enforced in the divorce state the
same conflict between valid judgments is presented, but the interest
of the divorce state in protecting its resident from being burdened
*with unreasonable support payments is now controlling and the di-
vorce state can deny full faith and credit to the support decree. The
two judgments, then, create an "irreconcilable conflict,' ' 23 each de-
cision valid in its own state, but neither entitled to full faith and
credit in the other.
That the presence of a strong state interest may at times warrant
an exception to the mandate of full faith and credit is not a new con-
cept.2' This principle has been applied to limit the extraterritorial
effect of state statutes25 and there are indications that similar reason-
19. See Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287, 1292 (1951);
Reese & Johnson, supra note 3, at 167; Note, 1956 Wash. U.L.Q. 224, 232.
20. 318 P.2d at 972.
21. Id. at 973.
22. Id. at 972.
23. These words used by the Washington court, id. at 972, have been used
before to describe the conflicting policies of states in marital disputes. Powell,
And Repent at Leisure, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930, 952 n.59 (1945). See Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 447 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
24. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (dissenting
opinion). Here Justice Stone argued that a state's interest in a minor child
domiciled within its boundaries was so important that it was not necessary to
give full faith and credit to a decree of child support rendered in another state.
See also Reese & Johnson, supra note 3, at 171.
25. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941); Pacific
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ing is employed in child support26 and custody27 cases. However, gen-
erally where a foreign judgment is sought to be enforced, the theory
is seldom utilized as a basis of decision, 28 although it is a recurring
argument in dissenting opinions. 29 While the interest exception is
grounded on the sound policy argument that in a particular case the
interest of a single state may outweigh the national policy of full faith
and credit,30 to apply this reasoning to support proceedings creates
many problems that seem to outweigh the advantages. Two conflict-
ing judgments may result, prolonging the settlement of disputes since
neither has force in the forum of the other.3 1 A third state could
logically accept or reject either of the conflicting decrees or perhaps
ignore both and re-litigate the issues, thus creating an additional ad-
judication of the same case further prolonging the settlement of the
rights of the parties. In addition, even where both parties appear and
the marital relationship and support rights are adjudicated in the
same action, if the wife is from another jurisdiction a logical exten-
sion of this concept would allow a redetermination of her support
rights by her own domiciliary state, since it has the same interest
whether the wife is personally served or not. This particular exten-
sion of reasoning, however, has been rejected by the Supreme Court.31
Finally, the "interest" exception is couched in such broad terms that
it would be very difficult to apply and easy to abuse.83
The "interest" reasoning employed by the Washington court is not
dictated by the Estin case. On the contrary, a close analysis of the
opinion and the more recent decisions of the Court leads to an op-
posite conclusion, i.e., that the second ground of the decision is con-
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 550 (1935).
See Carnahan, What is Happening in the Conflict of Laws: Three Supreme Court
Cases, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 607, 614 (1953).
26. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 616 (1947) (con-
curring opinion).
27. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953) (concurring opinion).
28. See Carnahan, supra note 25, at 613; Reese & Johnson, supra note 3, at 171.
Policy considerations of the state seem to be the bases of the decisions in
Esenwein v. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945), and Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226 (1945) (Williams II).
29. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356 (1948) (dissenting opinion);
Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 554 (1947) (dissenting opinion); Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 447 (1943) (dissenting opinion); Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (dissenting opinion).
30. See Reese & Johnson, supra note 3, at 163-64.
31. See text supported by note 23 supra.
32. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 354-56 (1948).
33. See Reese & Johnson, supra note 3, at 164. The writers compare the "in-
terest" exception to the reasonableness test used under due process.
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trolling. The issue in the Estin case is framed by the Court in terms
of whether the divorcing state could properly determine the support
rights of the wife when she was not personally served with process.3 4
The Court, after finding that support rights are an intangible prop-
erty interest which cannot be deprived the wife without personal ju-
risdiction over her,35 concludes that since the divorcing state lacked
this personal jurisdiction its judgment was not entitled to full faith
and credit.36 This result, in terms of the issue, suggests that although
a divorce proceeding may be ex parte in severing the marital relation-
ship it must be in personam insofar as it affects the "property rights"
of the wife. In the Armstrong case, a concurring opinion interpreted
the Estin decision as holding that an alimony judgment could only be
rendered in an in personam proceeding.37 Significantly, this concur-
ring opinion was adopted by the majority in Vanderbilt v. Vander-
bilt, the most recent Supreme Court decision on divisible divorce,
where it was held that an ex parte decree is void as far as it affects
the wife's support rights.38 If the judgment is void there is no ques-
tion that it is not entitled to full faith and credit and, in addition,
could even be collaterally attacked in the state rendering the ex parte
decree."9 The language and results of these three cases clearly seem
to indicate that the "property right" reasoning is the true ground for
allowing a separation of the elements of divorce. The divisible di-
vorce doctrine, then, is based on due process, i.e., the wife's right to
support cannot be taken away without personal jurisdiction over her,
and is not based on an exception to the full faith and credit clause.
By placing the divisible divorce doctrine on due process grounds the
problem of "irreconcilable judgments" is solved, because only one
support decree would be valid. For instance, an ex parte divorce, ad-
judicating the support rights of the wife, rendered in state A would
be valid in the wife's domicile, state B, as terminating the marital
relationship. However, a subsequent support judgment rendered with
personal jurisdiction over both parties in state B would be entitled
34. 334 U.S. at 547.
35. Id. at 548.
36. Id. at 549.
37. 350 U.S. at 576.
38. 354 U. S. at 419.
39. If the nature of the wife's right is a "property interest" which cannot be
taken away without an in personam judgment, then on long-standing principles
any support judgment rendered in an ex parte proceeding would have no force.
"[W]here the entire object of the action is to determine the personal rights and
obligations of the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in personam, con-
structive service ... is ineffectual for any purpose...." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 727 (1877). (Emphasis added.)
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to full faith and credit in state A, since that portion of its judgment
adjudicating support rights is void. A third state, faced with both
judgments, could give force to each without any conflict as to the
valid portion of either judgment. Use of the property right-due
process rationale lends some stability and predictability to a deter-
mination of the wife's rights. Also, it should be noted that this rea-
soning places the wife on equal footing with the husband, i.e., the
wife's right to support cannot be deprived her without personal ju-
risdiction over her, just as the husband's duty to pay cannot be de-
termined without personal jurisdiction over him.4 0
The "property right" reasoning, however, does have some impor-
tant limitations. Divorce was unknown to the common law and is
entirely of statutory origin.41 The right of the wife to support follow-
ing the termination of the marital relationship is of like origin. 4- As
previously noted, many state statutes make the right to support or
-alimony contingent on the existence of the marital relationship. 43 If
the wife seeks support under such a statute after her husband has
secured an ex parte decree elsewhere, she will be unsuccessful since
the existence of the right depends on the existence of the marital re-
lationship. In a situation, as in the Estin case, where the wife has
protected her support rights by instituting a prior support proceeding
and the interpretation of the state law provides that the prior action
survives the decree, she will prevail in a subsequent action. Similarly,
where the state in which the wife is resident has a statute which al-
lows support to be granted after the divorce, she will retain the right
to sue following an ex parte decree. Thus, the property right which
cannot be deprived the wife without due process of law is an elusive
one, depending for life upon the existence of a favorable state statute.
Where the statute does not exist the right dies with the divorce.
It should also be noted that classification of the wife's right to sup-
port as a "property right" is based on policy grounds rather than on
40. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1957) (dictum); Arm-
strong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1956) (dictum); Pollock v. Pollock,
273 Wis. 233, 248, 77 N.W.2d 485, 494 (1956) (dictum); 2 Bishop, Marriage &
Divorce §§ 159, 169-70 (6th ed. 1881).
41. See Madden, Domestic Relations §§ 81-82 (1931). The term divorce may
mean either a divorce "from bed and board" (separate maintenance) or a di-
vorce "from the bond of marriage" (absolute divorce). The textual statement
refers to the latter.
42. Alimony, i.e., an award of future payments granted in conjunction with
an absolute divorce, has been authorized in absence of a statute, but only as an
incident to a divorce proceeding based on a statute. The majority of American
states have specific statutes authorizing alimony. Madden, Domestic Relations
§§ 97-98 (1931).
43. See text supported by note 11 supra; Note, 1956 Wash. U.L.Q. 224, 239-44.
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a traditional legal rule.44 The basic policy of protecting the absent
party's interest in an ex parte divorce situation is the same whether
the "state interest" or "property right" criterion is used. Although
classification of the right to support as a "property right" may be a
fiction, such a classification effectively serves to provide for the au-
tomatic application of well-established rules of due process and full
faith and credit to support cases and lends predictability to an area
now plagued by uncertainties.
Application of the "property right" reasoning to the Washington
case would alter the ultimate result, but would not necessarily require
the Washington court to recognize the second and third Massachusetts
execution judgments. That portion of the Washington decree pur-
porting to pass on any alimony rights of the wife would be void45
since the wife made no appearance in the proceeding. This does not
mean, however, that the Massachusetts execution judgments were en-
titled to full faith and credit. The original support action in Mas-
sachusetts was brought under a statute46 which gave a right to sup-
port only so long as the marriage was in existence and, in addition,
decisions by the Massachusetts court clearly hold that support
granted under the statute terminates with a divorce decree.47 Since
Massachusetts was required to give full faith and credit to the Wash-
ington divorce decree,4 the last two execution judgments were void by
Massachusetts law and, therefore, not entitled to full faith and credit.
There is an additional reason why the Massachusetts execution judg-
ments could be questioned. Although part of the original support ac-
tion, an execution can be had on arrears in alimony or support pay-
ments only if proper notice is given to the absent party.49 No notice
was given to H as to the third execution judgment and there was
some question whether proper notice was given in the granting of the
second execution. Improper notice would be an adequate ground for
refusing full faith to these actions.5
Because the Washington court discussed these methods of refusing
to give validity to the Massachusetts judgments and because they
44. See Carnahan, supra note 25, at 630.
45. See notes 39-40 supra, and text supported thereby.
46. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 209, § 32 (1955), provides for support of the wife and
minor children if they are deserted by the husband. Massachusetts also has a
statute which provides for the granting of alimony after a divorce. Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 208, § 34 (1955).
47. Shain v. Shain, 324 Mass. 603, 88 N.E.2d 143 (1949); Rosa v. Rosa, 296
Mass. 271, 5 N.E.2d 417 (1936).
48. See text supported by note 10 supra.
49. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1945).
50. See id. at 228.
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could have reached the same result on this reasoning alone, it is curi-
ous why it resorted to the "interest" reasoning at all. There seem to
be at least three reasons: (1) The Washington court may have been
unwilling to declare a part of its own lower court's decree void inso-
far as it attempted to pass on the alimony rights of W. (2) Mas-
sachusetts could change its substantive law to allow the support pro-
ceeding to survive the granting of a divorce,,' which would mean that
if proper notice were provided to future execution proceedings on the
support arrears the execution judgments would be valid. (3) W
could amend her original petition to ask for alimony under another
Massachusetts statute, permitting the granting of alimony after a
divorce,5 2 then provided the personal service obtained with the orig-
inal petition carries over, the alimony judgment would be valid. An
additional policy reason in this particular case may be the fact that
the wife seemed to be the party who caused the break up of the mar-
riage. By adopting the "interest" reasoning Washington was pro-
tecting itself against all possible future actions by the wife.
Although the motives of the Washington court in this particular
case might have influenced the result, it is submitted that an analysis
of divisible divorce cases leads to the conclusion that the divisible di-
vorce doctrine is based on property right-due process grounds and
that this realization will solve many of the conflict of laws problems
created by compulsory extraterritorial recognition of ex parte di-
vorces.
The difficulties created by migratory divorces are by no means
solved. State legislation is needed to preserve the support rights of
the wife where statutes now leave her without a remedy. Even if
a favorable statute exists, if the wife is unable to serve the person
of the husband with process or attach his property within the state
the existence of a remedy will be of little use.5 3 This raises the
51. Apparently the New York courts, in order to provide relief for Mrs. Estin,
changed its substantive law to permit the survival of the prior support proceed-
ing. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544, 552 (dissenting opinion) (1948).
52. See note 46 supra.
53. Since alimony is a personal claim against the husband the court must have
personal jurisdiction over him or be able to sequester his property within the
state before an adjudication awarding alimony will be valid. See authorities cited
note 40 supra.
By splitting the elements of divorce the hardships created when a husband
obtains an ex parte decree by a quick trip to Florida or Nevada are, in practical-
ity, solved. Following a decree the husband usually returns to the state of matri-
monial domicile. In doing so he makes himself available for service of pro-
cess. Since any ex parte adjudication of support rights is void the wife will not
lose her right to sue for support, provided the state gives her a remedy by statute.
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further question of whether a wife can migrate from state to state
seeking the proper combination of a favorable statute and property
of the husband, and finding it, establish a residence and sue for
alimony. Although this question has not been directly decided at
least one member of the Supreme Court has verbalized his opposition
to such a step. 4
54. Justice Harlan would limit recovery of alimony after an ex parte decree
to the state in which the wife was domiciled at the time of divorce on the ground
that no other state would have an "interest" in the situation. Therefore, he would
not hold the ex parte support decree entirely void, but rather he would give it
effect in all states except the state in which the wife is domiciled at the time of
the divorce. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 434 (1957) (dissenting
opinion).
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